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Stephen Turner’s Explaining the Normative is probably a puzzling work for the average 
empirical social scientist. Turner devotes more than two hundred pages and considerable 
argumentative efforts to build a compelling case against what he calls ‘normativism’. His 
main thesis is that what ‘normativist’ philosophers call ‘normative facts’ are not special 
or transcendental in any meaningful sense, but can be fully grasped by social science 
standard explanations and even by naturalistic ones. I think most social scientists would 
agree with this thesis, and would in fact consider it as a trivial truth. However, Turner goes 
further to suggest that ‘normative talk’ and notions as ‘normative correctness’ are just 
bogus talk or simply the folk way we use to describe some of our cultural practices, but 
have no explanatory relevance or rational meaning. I think that far fewer social scientists 
would buy this second claim.
In all fairness, it should be acknowledged that Turner’s book is written having in mind 
a philosophical audience (or perhaps a ‘social theory’ audience) rather than a social-
scientific or sociological one. But since the invitation for commenting on his book comes 
from a sociology journal, I will try to present what in my opinion would be a very usual 
social-scientific look on the issues Turner is concerned about. I advance that I fully share 
the general spirit of Turner’s criticism of ‘normativism’, as well as his sympathy for the 
present naturalistic and anti-metaphysical trends in social science and philosophy. Howe-
ver, I would like to point to some apparent disagreements with the kind of social science 
I am engaged with.
Four views on ‘normative facts’
 
The book’s playing field is inhabited by two players: on one side we have the ‘normati-
vists’, who claim that ‘normative facts’ are inescapable; that they involve such concepts 
as ‘correctness’ or ‘validity’, which are ‘conditions of possibility’ of our social life; that 
these facts involve a ‘surplus value’ in front of standard social-scientific descriptions, and 
that therefore they are outside of the ordinary stream of causal explanation.  On the other 
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side, we have the ‘antinormativists’, who think that those facts, if they really exist as such, 
are part of the causal structure of the empirical world, are to be sociologically described 
as local beliefs, and do not have any special transcendental quality or ‘validity’. Turner 
clearly takes side with the latter.
However, two more players also contend to win the game. According to the third one, 
Turner is right that the normativist claim to immunize normative facts from causal expla-
nations is untenable. But at the same time, he thinks that Turner goes too far when he 
infers from this that all normative talk is mysticism and metaphysical circular thinking, and 
when he suggests that we could perfectly eliminate normative facts from our explanatory 
accounts of social reality. The third player (who I think incarnates the present advanced 
social science’s view) thinks, to say it in Turner’s words, that the ‘surplus value’ in nor-
mative facts may be real (though ontologically subjective, as most social realities) and 
that normative facts should and can be integrated into our scientific explanations of social 
actions and social reality. 
Figure 1 may clarify this, by showing that there are two different questions merged 
in Turner’s characterization of the debate, and that to disentangle them may throw more 
light on it. The debate between Turner (lower left-cell) and the ‘normativists’ (upper-right 
Can ‘normative facts’ be ‘naturalized’ or integrated in the ordinary stream of causal 
explanation?
Yes No
Are ‘normative 
facts’ and 
‘normative 
validity’ 
necessary 
and relevant 
concepts?
(are they 
something 
more than 
‘bogus talk’?)
Yes
• Weber, Durkheim, Tocqueville
• Boudon, Elster, analytical sociology
• Gigerenzer, Gintis, evolutionary theory, 
non-eliminative neuroscience
• Rational choice theory and decision theory
• Sen, normative economics, social choice 
theory
• Rawlsian political philosophy
• Functionalism
• Critical theory, Habermas, Giddens, prag-
matism, critical realism, conflict theory...
• ‘Normativists’ (in Turner’s sense)
No
• Turner
• Eliminative neuroscience
• Classical Marxism
• Structuralism
• Exchange theory
• Anti-realist, postmodern, post-
structuralist, relativistic ‘social 
theory’
• Hermeneutics
• Radical social constructionism
Figure 1. 
Four different views in the debate on ‘normative facts’
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cell) is the topic of the book. However, as my classification suggests, I believe most 
present and historical social science trends are simply ignored in that debate, particularly 
those situated in the upper-left cell (I will not refer here to those in the lower-right cell for 
reasons of space).
Turner’s ‘social science’
A first puzzling fact is that in Explaining the Normative, social science is often simply iden-
tified with some selected ‘classics’ plus some particular trends in relativistic anthropology 
and sociology so that the ‘conflict between normativism and social science’ suspiciously 
looks very much like the classical ‘rationality vs. relativism’ debate which took place from 
the sixties to the eighties of the past century. This is certainly a very limited and outdated 
conception of ‘social science’. It is also surprising that Turner tends to identify descripti-
vist ethnography with ‘causal explanation’, when the first has traditionally denied the very 
possibility of the second. It is curious, too, that in a book entitled Explaining the Normative 
it is hard to find one single explanation of any normative empirical social fact, while con-
temporary social science and evolutionary theory are full of examples  (see, for example, 
Bicchieri 2006; Binmore 2005; Boudon 2001, 2003; Camerer and Fehr 2004; Elster 2007, 
2009; Esser 2009; Fehr and Gintis 2007; Gigerenzer and Sturm 2012; Hedström & Bear-
man 2009; Hechter and Opp 2001; Kuran 1995; Petersen et al. 2012). 
If one takes a closer look at contemporary analytical sociology, behavioural and 
experimental social science, heuristics and biases theory, behavioural rational choice 
and collective action theories, computational sociology and economics, evolutionary 
game theory and psychology, social norms theory, research on prosocial motivations 
and social justice perceptions, etc. (not to mention contemporary political science, 
social stratification studies, institutional design and institutional economics, biological 
anthropology, or many other sub-disciplines and fields), I suspect that some of the 
issues disputed in the book would hardly survive as more than historical, scholastic 
debates. So my criticism, in a nutshell, would be: too much hermeneutic social theory 
and ethnography from the 1970s, too much ‘armchair’ philosophy, and too little contem-
porary social science and applied normative theory. 
The social-scientific explanation of ‘normative facts’
The empirical social scientist who is committed to usual scientific methods and procedu-
res would get over the discussions contained in Turner’s book in a rather pragmatic way. 
Many fertile and informative works in contemporary social science simply take for granted 
some solutions (or dissolutions) of those discussions, so in Marxian words they exemplify 
that ‘the proof of the cake is to eat it’. The usual (at least for me) social-scientific view 
would go like this: social norms, conventions, normative beliefs, ethical or political beliefs 
and attitudes, and the like, are considered as propositional mental states individuals may 
hold (‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’), whose causes and effects may in principle be investigated 
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empirically. As such, normative beliefs do not pose more epistemological or ontological 
problems than factual beliefs or other cognitive mental states.1
Understood in this way, ‘normative’ may be a proper label for some type of propo-
sitional contents of mental states (or some or their properties). It is not clear to me how 
problematic it is that they are ‘empirically inaccessible’ (Turner 2010: 1): in a sense, all 
mental states are (just as some distant planets), but, in another, humans have abilities 
to infer and attribute to others mental states and their propositional contents with some 
degree of confidence. Moreover, psychology and the social sciences have notably refi-
ned different methods and sophisticated techniques to improve the epistemic quality 
of these kind of inferences and attributions (as astronomy has done in order to detect 
distant planets). Therefore, it is not true that ‘normative facts’ are ‘not part of the ordinary 
stream of explanation’ (íbid.), for their efficient causes and subsequent effects on beha-
viour and social institutions may be a matter of empirical scientific research. 
Take, for example, Bicchieri’s recent and widely discussed book The Grammar of 
Society (2006), where the most refined tools of contemporary sociology, behavioural 
economics, and social psychology are combined in order to produce a compelling defini-
tion and explanation of social norms as equilibria reached from mutual expectations and 
sanctions in interactions where some salient feature psychologically triggers a ‘norm’ 
frame. This is an empirically founded and theoretically well-constructed account of (some 
kinds of) normativity in social interaction, where, ontologically speaking, nothing more 
than propositional mental states and individual actions is needed.
The ‘disconnection’ between the ‘causal’ and the ‘normative’ worlds
 
The paradox is that, while Turner wants to criticize ‘normativists’, he nonetheless seems 
to accept one of their basic assumptions, the ‘disconnection’ between the ‘causal’ and 
the ‘normative’ worlds, that is to say, that normative facts are to be either eliminated or 
located out of the causal chains of the empirical world. If you think like that and you are 
scientifically minded you will probably be led to the conclusion (as Turner is) that there is 
nothing like ‘the normative’. But why should we not take normative facts as a type of facts 
(or properties of some facts) in the causal world, just as any other? Then we would really 
be rejecting the normativists’ assumption of the ‘disconnection’ and integrating normative 
facts into the causal world without eliminating them.
 1 Unless we start from the assumption that ‘mental states’ are themselves problematic entities, but in 
that case all the ‘normativity’ debate is simply eliminated as senseless, along with any reference to inten-
tions, beliefs and desires, be they ‘normative’ or not. Note that if we discard propositional mental states as 
legitimate entities in social science explanations, then we are inescapably led to some sort of behaviourism; 
and behaviourism was abandoned in social science and psychology for very good reasons. In previous work, 
Turner himself claims that the ‘folk psychology’ used in mainstream sociology is something more than a ‘Good 
Bad Theory’ (Turner 2002: 7-8).
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If we accept (as I think we should) that the adjective ‘normative’ refers just to an inten-
sional property of the contents of some mental states, and we also accept the standard 
desire-belief explanations of human action as scientifically legitimate, then there is no 
disconnection at all: some normative mental states may be causing some actions (and 
therefore, through complex composition processes, some macrosocial phenomena), and 
may themselves be caused by other previous events, whether they are other normative 
mental states, non-normative ones, or just non-mental events. This is the standard way 
of explanation in the social sciences, and in general terms I hardly see what is wrong with 
it (nor what alternative way of explanation is available).
Turner points out that normativists might reply: this is just a descriptivist account in 
which you use the adjective ‘normative’ in a purely taxonomic way, but the fact is that the 
‘normative validity’ of some actions and beliefs might be an essential part of the explanation 
or the understanding of those phenomena, so this purely ‘taxonomical’ use of ‘normative’ 
won’t do. I think that normativists are right when they point out that ‘correctness’ or ‘validity’ 
is an important issue (and I will comment later on how accepted sociological explanations 
like Weber’s or rational choice theory’s support this claim). But I agree with Turner that they 
are wrong when they imply that ‘normative validity’ is ‘constitutive’ in a somehow mysterious 
way, and not simply explanatory in a conventional causal sense. Let me explain.
From a scientific, explanatory point of view, it is not a problem that besides first-order 
normative mental states we also have second-order mental states on the ‘validity’ of 
the former (or of some actions caused by them). Whether we judge the concordance of 
actions or beliefs with a given rule, or we judge the ‘validity’ (logical, technical, moral, 
semantic, etc.) of the rule itself, ‘normative’ is still a predicate of mental states, which are 
in the stream of causal explanation. Boudon (2001) has shown how we can plausibly 
reconstruct causal chains that take into account different orders of normative beliefs. In 
fact, whether a normative prescription or belief is ‘valid’ or not is not always to be deter-
mined by the community or subjectively, but often can be judged in an objective way 
through contrasting with external brute facts or, to use Searle’s term (1995), with institu-
tional facts. For example, the validity of the normative claim that ‘it is truth that Everest 
is the highest mountain on earth’ is to be empirically determined, and if it is found to be 
a valid claim, this property may of course have a causal influence on some individuals’ 
beliefs and actions. Similarly, the validity of the claim ‘it is truth that I am married’ is also 
to be empirically determined even if the relevant facts are social or institutional. Nowhere 
in these examples is there a break in the causal chain from objective facts to beliefs in 
the validity of claims and to relevant effects in individuals’ beliefs and actions. So where 
is the ‘disconnection’ to be placed? Turner is right that there is not a ‘normative account’ 
of the world which runs parallel to the ‘causal-empirical’ description; but he does not fully 
acknowledge that some facts within that ‘causal-empirical’ description have normative 
properties which are causally relevant (through mental causation of actions).
The basic problem of normativism according to Turner is that, at some point, 
‘something normative has to come out from something nonnormative’ (2010: 192). But 
the trick here, as he argues, is to define ‘normative’ in such a way that fabricates the pro-
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blem itself in a tautological and circular way. If one defines ‘normative’ just as a specific 
property of the propositional content of some mental states, the problem is not bigger 
than the classic one of how mental states come out of something which is not mental 
(or, to go all the way through, of how something solid comes out of something non-solid, 
or how something organic comes out of inorganic matter, and so forth). In fact, why 
focus just on normativity?  We could pose the same ‘problem’ for any property we could 
attribute to mental states: how does something ‘cognitive’ come out of something non-
cognitive?, how does something ‘expressive’ come out of something non-expressive?, 
how does the ‘sense of beauty’ come out of something senseless?, and so on. Defined 
as a property of the propositional content of some mental states, the problem disappears 
as a transcendental one and becomes a tractable, empirical question (which does not 
mean an easy one): how prescriptive propositional contents of mental states come out of 
non-prescriptive ones and non-mental facts.
The role of ‘normative validity’ in social science explanations
Turner is right that Weber already viewed values and norms as sociological facts. But he 
was not an ontological or epistemic relativist like other more recent sociologists or anthro-
pologists. He gave a central role (and a normative role) to rationality in the explanation 
of actions, beliefs, and social institutions. This poses a problem for Turner’s too simple 
narrative of a confrontation between Weber’s sociological point of view and ‘normati-
vism’: in his famous Zwischenbetrachtung, Weber explicitly wrote that rationality (and not 
only sociological factors such as interests, traditions, or social emotions) is inescapable 
in order to explain some social phenomena and actions: “The rational, in the sense of 
the logical or teleological ‘consistency’ of an intellectual-theoretical or practical-ethical 
stand, exerts and has always exerted power over men”; he even called this “the effect of 
ratio” (1915-19: 528). Weber’s famous metaphor of ideational systems and worldviews 
as ‘rail switchmen’ (íbid.: 247) who impose their own ‘logic’ or ‘legality’ over sociological 
and economic facts is equivalent to saying that rational internal (normative!) relationships 
between ideas and beliefs may have their own causal efficacy in producing social phe-
nomena. So was Weber, after all, a ‘normativist’ according to Turner’s characterization? 
The answer, in my opinion, is that the confrontation is partially made out of straw men. 
I think Weber correctly meant that it is perfectly possible to insert ‘the normative’ in the 
ordinary stream of causal explanation, while, at the same time, acknowledging that the 
‘validity’ of some normative reasons is causing (in exactly the same sense of causality) 
some of the social actions and phenomena we want to explain. That is what Weber in 
fact applied in his writings when, for instance, he talked extensively about how the ‘psy-
chological and pragmatic implications of religions’ (íbid.: 234) were often more important 
to explain behaviour than material interests or economic structures; or when he noted 
the consequences on behaviour of the conflict between a religion’s ‘rational aspirations’ 
and its ‘irrational’ components (íbid.: 506). This is a sound and common methodological 
strategy which has often allowed for explanatory success in social science. 
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For example, Elster’s work on the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ (Elster 1998) shows 
how impartial and egalitarian ideas are difficult to oppose publicly, and Harsanyi (1969) 
already showed years before how ‘impartiality’ is a ‘normative’ force in achieving social 
and strategic equilibria. Other well-known social phenomena such as ‘pluralistic igno-
rance’ (Bicchieri 2006; Kuran 1995), which explains intriguing facts about the prevalence 
of unpopular or inefficient social norms, could not even be formulated or detected if we 
forbade ourselves to describe individuals’ beliefs about their peers’ commitment to the 
norm as false but rational (because they rationally infer such a commitment from beha-
viour that is apparently consistent with the norm). The fact that the beliefs are false is 
an essential part of the explanation itself, but the social scientists who study pluralistic 
ignorance are not engaging in mysticism or metaphysical arguments about ‘normati-
vity’ in any recognisable way. Under another description which ignores the issue of the 
‘validity’ of the beliefs, the substantive causal explanation of the phenomenon (not any 
metaphysical and tautological ‘surplus value’) would be gone.2
Of course we could ask what makes ‘valid’ beliefs produce some causal effects ins-
tead of others, as well as under which conditions ‘valid’ beliefs are more likely to be 
held (some branches of applied epistemology have given interesting answers to these 
issues). We can even try to give a naturalistic explanation of all that. For example, the 
classical ‘money-pump’ argument (Davidson et al. 1955) offers a plausible evolutionary 
explanation of transitivity in preference ordering: non-transitive individuals would be eco-
nomically exploited by transitive ones and thus would go extinct. It is true that recent 
research on heuristics and biases shows that strict rationality is systematically violated 
by humans, probably for adaptive reasons (Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Gilovich et al. 
2002). But the point is that even in these cases there is something non-arbitrary in terms 
of ‘validity’ that explains the adoption of some rules, beliefs, or decisions (for a good 
recent review of the issue, see Gigerenzer and Sturm 2012). So I would say that Weber’s 
intuitions, but also Boudon’s and Elster’s, are confirmed by contemporary cognitive and 
evolutionary psychology: some types of ideas are psychologically more ‘appealing’ than 
others on evolutionary and adaptive grounds. All this evidence does not fit well with 
Turner’s suggestion that explanations in terms of contextual and culturally acquired “dis-
positions and habits” do “all the explanatory work” (2010:110).
Decision theory and the rational choice approach as ‘normative’
Take rational choice theory and decision theory in general: it is widely accepted that 
they may be used in a normative as well as in an explanatory way. One can use both 
the axioms of the theory to assess the rationality of a choice or action, and to explain 
it if one assumes some degree of rationality in the agent (which more often than is 
 2 The same is true of other well-known psychological mechanisms such as cognitive dissonance or wish-
ful thinking.
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thought seems like a realistic assumption). In Elster’s words, a rational action is defi-
ned as “behavior that is optimal from the point of view of the agent and performed, 
moreover, because it is perceived to be optimal” (2000:28, emphasis added).  The 
same idea is expressed by Boudon and many others by saying that in a rational choice 
explanation the ends-means rationality of the action is its own explanation. But the way 
Turner (and perhaps the normativists) presents the discussion seems to involve that 
if the explanatory use is possible, then the normative use is futile or illusory, and the 
reverse. But why should this be like that at all? Users of rational choice theory do not 
have deep philosophical problems when they use the theory in both senses, but rather 
see them as fully compatible and often complementary. Once again, the proof of the 
cake is to eat it.
In fact, the postulates of rational choice theory are purely logical and mathematical 
inferences from a very simple set of assumptions. It is a formal theory, not a subs-
tantive one, as game theory is a mathematical theory which may find applications in 
very different fields. So if the ‘normativity’ of the logical rules or mathematical truths 
that form the axioms of the theory is an ontological or metaphysical problem, then the 
same applies to natural sciences, which have been using those tools extensively. The 
question for all the contenders in the normativist debate is then: why should normativity 
be a problem in the social sciences if it is not in natural or ‘hard’ ones? Turner tends to 
write about normativity in a social-moral sense or in a ‘conventional’ sense (semantic 
rules, social conventions, and the like), but not in an epistemic, logical, or mathemati-
cal sense. But why not? The problems with normativity, as he defines them, should be 
similar in both cases.
Searle to the rescue: Institutional facts vs. brute facts
In other words, the normativity of decision theory poses no less problem than the nor-
mativity of law. Why does Turner not focus on decision theory as a ‘paradigm-case’ of 
his discussion? My impression is that, if he had done so, he would have more rapidly 
and easily come to this conclusion: ‘correctness’ in decision theory has the meaning 
of whether an action or decision is causally adequate and efficient (or even optimal) to 
produce some result. So here is a kind of normativity which is explicitly and obviously 
linked to the causal structure of the world and as such to the ‘ordinary stream of causal 
explanation’, to adaptive and evolutionary selection explanations of their standards, etc., 
but which is not eliminable, since it is doing ‘part of the explanatory work’ in the study of 
human behaviour. The fact that ‘legal norms’ are not so obviously explainable in that way 
shows, first, that we are placing completely different things under the label of ‘normati-
vity’, and second, that the ones that are not directly linked with brute facts (because they 
are ‘institutional facts’ or ‘assignment of status functions’ in Searle’s terms) may ask for 
an historical or sociological explanation (however, as Searle convincingly shows, even in 
this sense normativity is not ontologically disconnected from the material world, since at 
the end of the status function’s chain there is always a brute fact). 
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To disentangle both kinds of ‘normativity’ may throw some light on the debate: the first 
kind (the ‘decision-theory-like’ normativity) is very directly linked with the causal structure 
of the world (following the model of Searle’s agentive functions), but the second (the 
‘legal-norms-like’ normativity) is not, since legal norms are status functions. Some kinds 
of ‘normativity’ may then be ‘universal’ (because they are based on agentive functions), 
some others are not (because they are ontologically subjective status functions which 
may vary culturally in time and space). Applying logical inference rules, efficacy and 
efficiency technical rules, and evaluating congruence with given rules, are all normative 
operations that fall under the first kind, while most conventions, semantic rules, ethical, 
moral, or social norms, may fall under the second. I suggest, then, that Turner could 
make some use of Searle’s sharp ontological distinctions to clarify the philosophical 
debates on ‘normativity’.
Ontological vs. epistemic objectivity in normative facts
Searle’s distinction between ‘ontological objectivity’ and ‘epistemic objectivity’ may also 
be useful for the discussion (but surprisingly is never mentioned by Turner).  The distinc-
tion, for instance, is what makes the difference (denied by Turner) between a Maori’s 
claim that ‘hau’ exists (Turner 2010: 61) and a normativist’s claim that there are rational 
and valid claims about normative issues. ‘Hau’ talk claims ontological objectivity, and in 
that sense is wrong. But most mainstream political philosophers make claims about the 
epistemic objectivity of normative facts. If they are institutional facts we are then justified 
in having a space of (valid or invalid) reasons about them, which is independent of the 
issue of how they are brought about causally (‘independent’ in that it is different business 
or ‘game’, not in an ontological-causal sense). This claim does not involve any kind of 
‘mysticism’ or ‘bogus’ talk: the claim that a goal by Messi in a football match was to be 
declared null or not does not involve any metaphysical mystery; it is possible to determine 
the goal’s validity objectively (for example by using cameras). And the question about its 
validity is independent from the causal analysis of how the rules of football historically 
emerged, of why Messi was playing better football today than in previous matches, or of 
why the referee declared the goal null.
The same distinction applies to other paradigmatic cases analyzed by Turner. For 
example, with regard to Kelsen’s idea that the normativity of law is necessary to describe 
some legal-social facts (2010: 74s); Turner suggests this is equivalent to saying that the 
existence of God is necessary to properly describe a church service. But the analogy 
does not hold: again it is quite easy to see that in the latter case the God-believers 
are claiming ontological objectivity (God’s existence as ontologically independent of the 
believers’ beliefs), while in the former Kelsen (or whoever) is only claiming epistemic 
objectivity (whether a decision or rule is ‘legally valid’ is to be determined in an episte-
mically objective manner, though ‘legal validity’ and ‘legal norms’ are not ontologically 
independent of human beliefs).
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Naturalization vs. elimination of normativity
In recent years, evolutionary theories, game theory, or the heuristic and biases approach 
have offered quite robust ways of advancing in the naturalization of human rationality and 
normative beliefs. If ‘the conflict between normativism and social science’, as Turner puts 
it, was such, then we should be seeing a strong quarrel between social scientists who 
rely on the idea of ‘explanation by reasons’ and the like (such as Elster, Boudon, analyti-
cal sociologists, etc.) and those who try to find evolutionary and naturalistic explanations 
for the origin of rationality and normativity. But what we see (even in Weber’s historical 
openness to what we call today ‘naturalistic explanations’) is exactly the opposite: both 
groups work very closely, they are establishing growing links between them, they are 
using each other’s work to strengthen their own, and they are often an active part in 
shared projects in both types of research. 
How is this possible? My answer is again: because there is no necessary opposition 
between some type of ‘normativism’ and ‘naturalistic’ social science. In short, because the 
naturalization of ‘normativity’ does not mean its elimination. My impression is that most 
social scientists who actively try to build causal explanations of normative facts would at 
the same time agree with Hilary Putnam’s claim that “The elimination of the normative is 
attempted mental suicide” (Putnam, 1982: 20). Causal reduction (and ‘naturalization’ is just 
a form of it) has to do with tracking causal links back to more and more elementary sources 
of the phenomena under study. Elimination has to do with encoding the same information 
in simpler ways, without informational loss. Clearly, normative beliefs may and should be 
causally reduced (it would be miraculous that they are not causally linked with the rest of 
facts in the world). But they will hardly be eliminated, since the information that normative 
explanations and language provides is not provided by statements about neuronal activity 
or interaction of elementary particles. It is not surprising, for the same applies to a Shakes-
peare play, to a digital photograph, to a jury’s decision, or to a Coke: they are all examples of 
how the combinations of certain elementary entities in certain ways cause a more complex 
phenomenon which may in turn be taken, under a certain relevant description, as having 
explanatory power for the generation of other kinds of phenomena.
So why should we act as if there is a problem with all this? Biology was virtually reduced 
to chemistry, and chemistry to physics, but chemistry and biology have not been eliminated 
as scientific disciplines which build their own explanations (with the reasonable condition that 
they are consistent with what we know of their reduction base). To empirically explain norma-
tive beliefs in a scientifically rigorous way (whether the explanations are based on neurology, 
biology, sociology, cognitive sciences, or whatever) is perfectly compatible with keeping nor-
mative facts as meaningful, and even as part of some social scientific explanations. 
Two legitimate tasks for normative talk
The proposed view does not throw social science in the arms of the elimination of the 
normative: first, because normative correctness may have an explanatory role when stu-
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dying some types of social behaviour; and second, because we can legitimately engage 
in rational and meaningful discussions on the validity and correctness of normative 
beliefs/theories according to several evaluative criteria.
I gave examples of the first, explanatory task in the preceding sections. An example of the 
second are contemporary political philosophy discussions on distributive justice since Rawls’ 
A Theory of Justice (1971), which have provided lots of interesting results; for example, on how 
to apply distributive justice rules to particular cases, which are the acceptable distribuenda, 
what is equality and how it is to be measured, which trade-offs we face between different 
normative ideals, and so on. Most interestingly, they have done so in constant dialogue and 
mutual enrichment with sophisticated social science (for example, with normative economics, 
political science, institutional design theories, social stratification studies, or cognitive psycho-
logy). It was Rawls himself who suggested that ethical and political philosophy should draw 
on some regularities and facts about human behaviour discovered by the social sciences.
In short: even when empirical contrast is not directly possible, as is the case with moral 
or ethical beliefs, the task of determining their ‘validity’ may still be a rational and legiti-
mate one, with its own methodology (like Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, for example), and 
without that task implying any disconnection with the empirical causal world at all.
‘Normativism’: weak and strong
Let me conclude: the best social-scientific work and the best normative theories we have 
available at present both agree that ‘normativity’ can and should be integrated in our empi-
rical world without eliminating issues about ‘normative validity’, and even allowing for some 
explanatory role for them when studying human behaviour. Under this lens, it seems like the 
‘normativist challenge’ (or, if one takes the other side, the ‘naturalistic challenge’) merits little 
concern by social scientists and applied normative theorists. Normativists’ ‘strong’ thesis 
that ‘normative facts’ are some kind of Platonic ‘essence’ (Turner sometimes call this ‘fun-
damentalism’) is trivially false. However, a ‘weak’ normativist thesis (as I have described it 
here) is perfectly acceptable by a scientifically-minded worldview.
The real gains in our understanding of what we have called ‘normative facts’ will 
come, I have little doubt, from empirical research in a variety of interrelated disciplines. 
A Spanish philosopher of science, Manuel Sacristán (1983), used to say that before 
having a good philosophy of social science, we probably need to have lots of good social 
science. I completely agree, and I think we are about to see real progress on these issues 
in the years to come; progress that perhaps will make some of the philosophical discus-
sions I have commented on here pointless.
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